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ON THE DEMISE OF SHAREHOLDER
PRIMACY (OR, MURDER ON THE
JAMES TRAINS EXPRESS)
ERIC TALLEY*

The hypothetical introduced by Vice Chancellor Leo Strine's Essay1
exposes an important arena of corporate governance where adherence to
the traditional norm of "shareholder primacy" is particularly troublesome.
In fact, it is hard to find an analogous domain of corporate governance law
that is as jarringly discontinuous as that found in the factual circumstances
suggested by Strine's hypothetical. Explicitly, the legal scrutiny accorded
to managers who resist a hostile acquisition depends critically on whether a
court invokes the Revlon doctrine or the Unocal doctrine as the appropriate
governing standard. Under the former (and its progeny),2 shareholder
primacy arguments carry great (and nearly exclusive) weight: corporate
directors must be able to demonstrate that its resistance is reasonably
calculated to maximize short-term shareholder value. Under the latter
doctrine,3 however, immediate shareholder interests are just one of a
panoply of considerations that directors may use to justify resistance to a
hostile bid. Moreover, the factual distinctions that separate a Revlon case
from a Unocal case can be surprisingly modest and nuanced. 4
Of course, a simple description of this legal discontinuity dramatically
undersells the aims of the James Trains hypothetical. Indeed, the
hypothetical itself spawns deeper questions about whether shareholder
* Professor of Law and Director, Center in Law, Economics, and Organization, University of
Southern California Law School.
1. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Social Responsibility of Boards of Directors and Stockholders in
Change in Control Transactions: Is There Any "There" There?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1177-85
(2002).
2. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182-83 (Del.
1986).
3. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
4. See, e.g., McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d. 910 (Del. 2000) (holding that a majority shareholder
who instigates an acquisition of the entire corporation by a third party must comply with Revlon duties).
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primacy arguments are normatively justified with principles transcending
the historical path dependence of judicial precedent. Even when a
company has committed to a course of action that would ordinarily invoke
Revlon, why should shareholder interests trump those of corporate
founders, employees, debtholders, communities, or other interested
constituencies? This is a difficult question to answer, and it is routinely
debated within the pages of countless law reviews, conference proceedings,
and legal briefs every year. 5
Like Strine, I have little interest in opining on the final result of this
hypothetical if the dispute were litigated in the Delaware courts (though I
earnestly hope that my former students would be part of the litigation teams
billing hours on the issue). I have a few perspectives on the hypothetical,
however, that diverge (albeit slightly) from Strine's and that might be
offered for general consumption.
As an initial matter, it is unclear whether one's ultimate position in the
James Trains hypothetical sheds much light on the (significantly) larger
issue of the purpose of the corporation. Indeed, although takeover law
garners a fair amount of popular and academic attention, relatively few
publicly traded firms (and no privately held firms) ever travel this quadrant
of the corporate jurisprudential universe. To be sure, noteworthy takeovers
occur every year, but one need not presume from this fact that either
takeovers are likely in the short- to medium-term lifespan of most firms, or
that the specter of an acquisition constitutes a defining characteristic of a
firm's identity.
Perhaps a better way to glean what's at stake is to inquire into whether
the issues presented by takeover law are in some way emblematic of all
corporate law. Here, one's conclusions are likely to be decidedly milder.
Indeed, the areas of corporate law likely to govern affairs within a firm
year-in and year-out view shareholder primacy arguments with markedly
less solicitude. Marketing decisions, compensation packages, product line
reforms, investment options, workforce adjustments, supply decisions, and
the like are rarely (if ever) matters in which shareholders may have much
of a say. Indeed, state statutes,6 federal regulations, and the infamous
"business judgment rule" (inter alia) all conspire to ensure that the
judgment of corporate boards can be challenged by dissenting shareholders
5. A Westlaw search, for example, reveals there to be well over 200 law review articles
discussing the term "shareholder primacy" within recent years.
6. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) (requiring affairs of a corporation to be
managed by a board of directors).
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only in the most extreme cases. And, while shareholders who disagree
with their boards can attempt to use the proxy system or the market for
corporate control as a means to displace directors, such devices are
extremely costly to invoke. In many respects then, it appears that much of
corporate law has already rejected shareholder primacy arguments in favor
of allowing managers greater freedom of action.
Notwithstanding the fact that much of corporate law explicitly parts
company with shareholder primacy as a positive matter, the James Trains
hypothetical may still introduce important questions about whether this
state of affairs is normatively justified. One distinction Strine draws in
posing this broader question is that between the "property" (or "residual
claimants") view of the firm and the "entity" view of the firm. 7 Consistent
with other commentators, Strine at times characterizes these two views as
constituting the "economic" versus "communitarian" accounts of the
corporation. Under this characterization, a rejection of the primacy norm
would in some way be tantamount to a rejection of the economic account of
the corporation.
This distinction, while common in corporate literature, seems a bit
exaggerated to me. In recent years, even among more economic-minded
thinkers, the property account of the corporation has fallen into a state of
considerable disrepair, for a number of reasons. Perhaps most noteworthy,
it no longer seems factually accurate to depict shareholders as the sole
"residual claimants" of a corporation, standing last in line to collect at the
corporate till should the firm go bankrupt. The formal lines separating the
various constituents of a corporation have become progressively blurred in
recent years. This has been true for some time with creditors, who
frequently own hybrid claims on a company that are easily convertible into
stock. Even more recently, however, other constituencies have gotten in on
the game. As a prime example, consider employees: an increasing number
of them hold stakes in their firms, which makes them increasingly resemble
shareholders. By one estimate, over ten million employees own significant
stock options (one of the volatile sorts of stock ownership), up from only
one million in 1992, and a majority of these workers are employed not by
technology firms, but by nonhigh-tech businesses. 8 Moreover, in a recent
survey of 247 companies, some seventy-four percent report that they
routinely grant options to nonmanagement employees at least every other
year as part of ongoing incentive pay programs. 9 The value of these annual
7.
8.
9.

Strine, supra note 1, at 1170-71.
Margaret A. Jacobs, The Legal Option, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2001, at R9.
Id.
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option grants range on average from $511,804 for chief executives to
$22,708 for salaried nontechnical employees to $7,982 for hourly
1°
employees.
In addition, however, when viewed from a contractual perspective
(which is how most economists tend to view things), the property/residual
claimant account of the firm can be downright inconsistent. Under a pure
contractarian view, a corporation is little more than a "nexus" or collection
of contracts. As such, the parties to this universe of contracts are (and
should be) expected to try to maximize their joint gains instead of only the
gains of a single party to the contract. This makes a great deal of sense: if a
governance system gives shareholders a minor advantage at the cost of
visiting large disadvantages on other constituencies (such as employees,
bondholders, and the like), all parties would be better off if the
disadvantaged constituencies "purchased" the advantage away from the
shareholders, compensating them through cash transfers, ex post
settlements, or other concessions. Consequently, if a court's principal
charge were to implement the terms of a contract that the parties would
have reached through Coasean bargaining, then an "efficient" corporate
law would necessarily balance the interests of shareholders with those of
others. It would be at least mildly surprising to find that such balancing
always favors shareholders."1
If most economists have also parted company with the pure property
view of the firm, then one wonders who might be left to champion its
merits. (To be perfectly candid, this population has been decreasing
rapidly of late, and the shareholder primacy argument has increasingly
become a straw person among academics.) Nonetheless, there may well be
a practical rationale for retaining some deference for shareholder primacy.
Indeed, shadows of these practical considerations are already evident in an
ongoing scholarly discourse. For example, very few advocates of a
multiconstituency view of the firm also advocate allowing nonshareholder
constituencies to have the same rights that shareholders have in bringing
derivative actions in right of the corporation against the boards of directors.
The reason for stopping short of such a position, one would guess, is that
such a state of affairs would give rise to an exponential rate of growth in
the filing of lawsuits (both legitimate and unfounded). Such administrative
10. Id.
II. See, e.g., Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the
Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 YALE L.J. 277, 281 (1998) (formalizing this argument and
noting that divergences from it would be due predominantly to capital constraints on the paying party).
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costs can make the litigation game unworthy of the candle, thereby
justifying a limitation on nonshareholders' rights to sue.
Interestingly, practical considerations like these also expose why there
may, ultimately, be a good reason for retaining shareholder primacy (at
least in certain situations) as a sensible allocation of corporate
responsibility. Indeed, the underlying reason that multiple constituents'
interests can be thwarted stems from a difficulty inherent in monitoring
managerial actions (or contracting over them) in public corporations.
Striving for balance among constituents' interests can help to ensure that
managers do not play favorites with one constituency over another, at a
12
potential efficiency loss.
There is, however, another type of monitoring dilemma that should be
of at least as much concern to all nonmanagerial constituencies in a
corporation: that directors will line their own pockets by diverting benefits
that would otherwise augment overall firm value. If managers are awarded
broad protection from legal scrutiny for such acts of self-dealing, it is likely
that most (if not all) other constituencies stand to lose. And it is in such
instances that shareholder primacy may play an important (and even
critical) role. For even if shareholders do not perfectly reflect the interests
of every constituency in the firm, they likely share some core common
interests (such as deterring managerial self-dealing). As such, one might
think twice about affording corporate fiduciaries a more potent defense
against shareholder litigation, permitting them to argue that some other
constituency's welfare gain justifies an action that (allegedly
13
coincidentally) enriches managers as well.
In a world where such defenses are available, we would have to rely
almost exclusively on other, extra-legal forms of managerial restraintsuch as markets for reputation or "norms" of selfless comportment-to
protect company interests from an "intervening hierarch" that remains
relatively immune from legal challenges.' 4 While such extra-legal forces
are certainly important, it is unclear whether they can completely carry the
deterrent load in a world of cutthroat competition, manipulative accounting,
12. For a recent take on whether such favoritism is necessarily bad in a strategic setting, see
Stephen Choi & Eric Talley, Playing Favorites with Shareholders, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 271, 326-44
(2002).
13. Or, as Frank Easterbrook and Dan Fischel put it their seminal book on corporate law, "[A]
manager told to serve two masters ... has been freed of both and is answerable to neither" FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 38 (1991).
14. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247, 250-51 (1999) (advocating such a system of extra-legal constraints).
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Ironically, these misgivings become
and imperfect monitoring.' 5
particularly salient as nonshareholder constituencies increasingly assume
positions alongside shareholders as "joint" residual claimants of the firm.
Indeed, with greater commonality of interest, shareholders can be expected
to pursue agendas that are even more closely aligned with the goals of other
constituencies.
A few years ago, I participated in a roundtable conference with a few
other corporate law professors, and we were attempting to summarize
contemporary corporate law in a nutshell. The most succinct and accurate
sound bite that surfaced was the following: "Don't jerk around any
constituency too badly, and you'll be ok."' 16 Many, of course, resisted this
definition, fearing that if word got out, our respective deans would require
us to start teaching other courses that had somewhat more substance and
content.
But when push comes to shove, the above sound bite may well be
exactly what modern corporate law has come to reflect. Of course, this
trajectory may be entirely appropriate-for corporations are by definition
multifaceted creations; their pressure points are many, and their structure
necessarily complex. But if that is the direction that corporate law is
heading, we should not be excessively cavalier about the challenges that a
multi-constituency legal account of the firm imposes, only a few of which I
have pointed out above. For if we are, the constituency that stands to lose
the most will be ourselves.
15. Indeed, it is worth noting that virtually none of the past year's prominent corporate and
securities scandals (such as Worldcom, Enron, Tyco, and Imclone, to name a few) involved allegations
that managers favored shareholders over other constituencies. Rather, their common thread appears to
be managerial self-dealing of some variety or another.
16. Though I cannot recall precisely who originated this statement, I believe that it was Henry
Hansmann.

